ORIGINAL ARTICLE

A Critique of the Application of Liberal Peace Theory in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Cases From African Experience

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Abstract

Michael Doyle (1983) pioneers contemporary liberal peace theory. He argued that no liberal democracy has ever gone to war with another liberal democracy. After nearly a decade, the victorious Western camp undisputedly declared the ontological and epistemological premises of liberal peace as a universalizing rationality of pacific order and a panacea for post-conflict societies. In the following years, peacebuilding interventions were launched under the auspice of the UN and other agencies in war torn countries with excessive liberal enthusiasm. However, conflicts in Africa have proved unwaveringly resistant to Western attempts to easily institute liberal peace. As Collier et al. (2003) noted, almost half of all post-conflict states relapsed to armed violence within the first decade of relative peace. This has generated a considerable debate and disagreement in the realm of scholarship and policy (Newman, Paris & Richmond, 2009). Responding to this debate, in this paper, I draw on data from World Bank, United Nations Development Program, Freedom House, and pertinent empirical research works to critically appraise the application of liberal peace theory in the context of post-conflict societies in Africa. It was found out that liberal peacebuilding instigated more damages to the ill-equipped post-conflict states. In conclusion, liberal peace is “acultural” and insensitive towards recipient of the peacebuilding and ultimately aimed at creating chronically dependent states.

Keywords: liberalism, peace, liberal peace, peacebuilding, post-conflict

Introduction

Peace can be viewed from multidimensional perspectives. However, the basic question “What is peace?” often appears in contemporary orthodoxy to have been settled in favor of liberal peace (Richmond, 2008). The genesis of liberal peace is rooted in the works of John Locke and Immanuel Kant. Locke (1997) argued that for individuals to enjoy freedoms like life, liberty, and property, they should live in a political entity that guarantees and protects individual liberty. Hence, the social contract is a way out of the perpetual anarchy of state of nature to establish a limited government that safeguards the individual’s physical, material, social and cultural security and freedoms (Doyle, 1983). Further, Kant (2015) noted that countries with republican governments are likely to behave more peacefully than those with authoritarian ones. Kant (2015) stated three corresponding factors that cause peace among democratic states. First, republican constitutions purge despotic whims that declare war. Second, the spread of democracy fosters recognition of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of the republics. This lays a moral foundation for liberal peace, upon which international law can ultimately be constructed. Third, economic cooperation strengthens constitutional restrictions and liberal customs via crafting international relations that promote tolerance instead of war. Therefore, the measurable inducement augments democratic states muscle to law and morality. Other prominent scholars

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such as Smith (1776), Hamilton (1887), Madison (1962), and Montesquieu (1772) have also contributed to the development of liberal peace (as cited in Willett, 2005).

Contemporary proponents of liberal peace like Doyle and Rummel have drawn heavily on the work of Kant. Doyle (1983) posits the historical records testify that democracies do not go to war with one another, this is dyadic peace. The characterizes of liberal states for him includes legal equality of citizens, a representative government, private property, and market economy. According to Doyle, “constitutionally secured liberal states have not thus far engaged in war with one another” (ibid: 213). And, they quite “liberally” go to war with non-liberal states. This pronouncement has led to the production of immense literature on liberal peace as the only viable solution to apply in war-torn states or societies. Rummel (1994), further, asserted that democracies are less likely than non-democratic societies to undergo internal strife such as civil wars and rebellions. As a result, Danilovic and Clare (2007) and Turner (2006) posits liberal states relish both international and domestic (civil) peace.

The liberal peace framework is embedded in the old-aged Western culture of liberal civil societies—“individual liberty, democracy, equality before the law, constitutionalism, and free market economy” (Richmond & Franks, 2008). In essence, liberal thinkers believe peace will flourish through cosmopolitan norms that inculcates and practices the ideals of liberalism, i.e. political and economic liberalization (Richmond, 2008). This idea of a liberal peace has been enormously instrumental in shaping and enlightening the “global experiment” of international interferences initiated at the end of the Cold War (Paris, 2010; Andersen, 2012).

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the victorious Western camp undisputedly declared the ontological and epistemological premises of liberal peace as a universalizing rationality of pacific order and a panacea for post-conflict societies. In the following years, peacebuilding interventions were launched under the auspices of the UN and other agencies in war-torn countries with excessive liberal enthusiasm (Millar, 2017). Two rationales explicate the grave global security challenge that intrastate or interstate wars pose and the need of peacebuilding. First, human misery or violations of human rights are attributed directly or indirectly to violent conflicts. Second, the paradigm that unstable and conflict-prone societies cause peril to global security order has been widely accepted especially after 9/11 terrorist attack (Newman et al., 2009). These peacebuilding efforts in war-torn states (in Africa or elsewhere) have been remarkably informed by the liberal peace thesis provided that the alternative ideology has faded away and capitalist ideology ushered in (Jahn, 2005; Call & Cousens, 2008; Paris, 2010).

However, conflicts in Africa have proved unwaveringly tough to the Western attempt to institute liberal peace easily (Willett, 2005). As Collier et al. (2003) noted, almost half of all post-conflict states relapsed to armed violence within the first decade of relative peace.

2 Conversely, Mearshemier (1990: 50) argued that “democracies have been few in number over the past two centuries, and thus there have not been many cases where two democracies were in a position to fight each other.”

3 Proponents of liberal peace have attempted to substantiate this claim (two democracies do not go to war) through quantitative research. However, as Clapham (as cited in Willett, 2005) argued, liberal ideas have been only accepted in Europe in the second half of the 20th century. All the differences in the West are exhausted and settled through War, not through negotiation. It is, in fact, the technological advancements like the nuclear or atomic bomb and the immense ravage of the WWII and its hangover that fosters peaceful coexistence in the West. And, if they resort to war in the 21st century, it would be uncivilized of them.
This has generated a considerable debate and disagreement in the realm of scholarship and policy (Newman, Paris & Richmond, 2009) ever since Boutros-Ghali’s address to the UN in 1992. Boutros-Ghali (1992), drawing from the work of Galtung4 (1976: 207), defined peacebuilding as “an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. According to Roberts (2011), the apex of the debate is marked by the intersection of two ontological trajectories. The first group argued in favor of dominant orthodoxy, albeit recognizing the mechanical defects. Proponents (such as Ronald Paris, Michale Doyle) have faith in the ontological and epistemological authenticity of liberal peace. The second “ontological vectors” or the “fourth generation” scholarship indict a range of failures of the orthodoxy liberal peacebuilding as descending states to ‘illiberal democracy’, violation of human rights, the creation of semi-authoritarian governments, etc.

Consequently, the current agenda advanced by the main actors in any multilateral peacebuilding initiative is premised on the notion of promoting democratic political reforms, instituting free market and a range of other institutions associated with “modern” states as mechanism to recuperate and foster positive peace (Paris, 2002; Newman et al., 2009; Taylor, 2007; Mcdonald & Sweeney, 2007; Turner, 2006).

Paris (2004) acknowledged the problems of liberal peacebuilding implementation, yet argued no viable alternatives exist. Chandler (2006), in contrast, critically questions the vested interest in Western interventions. Richmond (2011) pointed out that liberal peacebuilding is hegemonic, top-down, and ethically bankrupt; others judge the illiberal outcome of peacebuilding (Pugh, 2011). The objective of this paper thus is to critically appraise the application of liberal peace in the post-conflict peacebuilding by drawing empirical cases from different countries of Africa. Specifically, the article tried to answer why the application of liberal peacebuilding is facing challenges in the post-conflict societies in Africa? And what are the blind spots in the implementation of liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict African countries?

**Methods**

To appraise the application of liberal peacebuilding in Africa, I draw on publicly available secondary data from the World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Freedom House, and Peace Fund of eight post-conflict African countries. These data include *Per Capita* Income, human development, fragility status, electoral democracies and freedom status reports covering the period from 2000-2017. I specifically examine the following countries: Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda. I intentionally chose these countries as they have undergone civil strife (new wars) in the post-Cold War period; and their post-conflict peacebuilding has been steered under the auspices of the UN following the ideals of liberal peace theory, i.e., economic and political liberalization.

Analysis of the data and discussion was carried out thematically, by categorizing the blind spots of liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict countries in light of the yearly reports of the aforementioned international institutions. For the purpose of clearly depicting the problems I have used tables and graphs.

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4 Galtung (1976) defined peacebuilding in relation to a conflict continuum that passed from pre-conflict prevention through peacemaking and peacekeeping.
Discussion and Analysis: Liberal Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Africa

In the post-Cold War, UN Peacebuilding Commission, NGOs, and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have engaged in various peacebuilding operations in Africa and elsewhere. A formulaic liberal peace has been guiding the peacebuilding missions across all recipients and virtually leaving similar unsatisfactory footprints. The ‘crisis’ of liberal peace has created a critical discussion over the inherent flows of liberal peacebuilding and ostensibly the debate has reached an impasse (Rampton & Nadarajah, 2017; Roberts, 2011). In the following section, based on my review and analysis of empirical researches on the topic, I have identified and discussed three main blind spots of liberal peacebuilding in the African context; (i) liberal peacebuilders have overlooked or undermined the intrinsic tension between democracy and liberalism; (ii) the defects of economic liberalization as a peacebuilding instrument; and finally (iii) an absence of local ownership and building of “virtual” peace.

Liberal peacebuilding underplayed the intrinsic tension between liberalism and democracy

Dahl (1971) explained three routes to democracy in his book Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. The first route involved making monarchies more liberal through conferring more freedom to the selected few within the arena of public participation. Thus they could openly contest for political power. This route is labeled as the least risky. The second, and the more risky route, is for democratization to precede liberalization. The political power becomes more inclusive of diverse people with divergent interests, but it creates mistrust among the new comers in the political arena of the state. The third route, the most risky one, is a shortcut where liberalization and democracy are juxstaposed – where mutual security is exceedingly daunting to establish.

In most cases, liberal peacebuilders opted for the “third route” to planting liberal norms and democratic institutions concurrently in post-conflict countries of Africa, which, historically, has never been the case. Here I argue, pronouncing democracy and liberal ideals as a panacea to domestic and international peacebuilding efforts, in the part of liberal peace proponents and policy makers, has created a backlash to the inbuilt intent of peacebuilding in war-torn states. The raison d'être here are twofold. First, democracy has its own conundrum. In this regard, Spiro (1994) argued that Kant, the pioneer of liberal peace, treated democracy and republic differently, for democracy is tyranny. Zakaria (1997: 7) also argued democratically elected governments continuously overlook the rights and freedoms of citizens and the vengeful majority could vote for or endeavor domestic violence against a despicable minority. He noted that “democracy does not necessarily bring about constitutional liberalism.”

Second, liberal (a cultural one) and democracy (structural) have inherent tension. This has been negligently instituted to the peacebuilding agenda in post-conflict countries of Africa. Peacebuilding in Africa aimed at entrenching liberal democracy – there were efforts for the political liberalization of post-conflict states. Zakaria (1997) and Fischer (2000) explained the inherent contradiction between liberal ideals and democratic procedures. Zakaria (1997) stated that initially, the West were liberal autocrats or semi-democracies but later evolved to liberal democracy in the 20th century. Further, Fischer (2000: 2) decrees policymakers “regularly speak of the need to promote democracy for the sake of peace.” This further laments democratic inclination embraces illiberal penchants of majority tyranny, pseudo equality, and demagogues effortlessly manipulate the mass.
Empirically, the African experience of peacebuilding attests to the above. For instance, political liberalization in Angola and Rwanda contributed to the resurgence of violence (Paris, 1997). In Angola, a cease-fire agreement with a clause of holding multiparty elections between Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) ended up with the resumption of full-scale civil war in 1993 (Paris, 1997; Schubert, 2010). Again, political liberalization in Rwanda briefly descended to aborted transition and epitome of an African Holocaust (Lemarchand, 1994). The Arusha Declaration officially ended the hostilities and instigated a peacebuilding process involving power-sharing and holding multi-party elections scheduled for 1995 under the supervision of UN. Eventually, by April 1994, Hutu extremist launched a horrific attack on the Tutsi minorities and hence none of the clauses incorporated in the agreement put into effect. Another political liberalization blow has been recorded in the peacebuilding efforts (Paris, 1997; Brahimi, 2007; Newbury, 1995). In Sudan, democratic elections have intensified conflict between the Muslim north and the Christian south. Besides, the 1997 election in Liberia brought Charles Taylor to power and led the relapse of civil war. The election of Kabah in Sierra Leone further exacerbated the civil war in 1997 (Kandeh, 2003; Harris, 2004). What is more, human rights violation and militarism characterize the democratically elected government of Burundi (Curtis, 2012; Council on Foreign Relations, 2015).

To further verify whether post-conflict peacebuilding efforts have achieved instituting electoral democracy and liberal norms, I draw on data from the Freedom House ‘Electoral Democracies’ and ‘Liberty’ reports of randomly selected countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Electoral Democracy Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2000 onwards</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2005-2010; 2011-2017</td>
<td>Yes; No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2000 onwards</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2000-01; 2005 onwards</td>
<td>Yes; No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2000-2009; 2010 onwards</td>
<td>Yes; No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Since 2000</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Since 2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Since 2000</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Since 2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Electoral democracy in selected post-conflict countries since 2000
Source: Compiled from Freedom House report.

The above table clearly illustrates, with the exceptions of Sierra Leone and Namibia, all countries have failed to fulfill the minimal requirement of democracy. Burundi, Liberia, and Mozambique enjoyed the recognition of the Freedom House briefly as an electoral democracy and transformed to semi-authoritarian regimes. Sierra Leone has been exceptionally acknowledged as electoral democracy since 2000. However, the same old men responsible for the civil war remained clutching the state apparatus (Hanlon, 2005). From Table 2 below one can understand that Angola, DRC and Rwanda are classified as “Not Free”. In contrast, UN Peacebuilding Commission has been active in Liberia, Burundi, and Sierra Leone; however they are ranked as “Partially Free”; Namibia is the only country hailed as “Free” by the Freedom House. However, the Freedom House report of Burundi, Mozambique, and Liberia clearly illuminates that being democratic and liberal are different, statistically.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>CL</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2000-05</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>NF</td>
<td>2006-10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NF</td>
<td>2011-17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>NF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2006-10</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>2011-17</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2011-17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2006-10</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>NF</td>
<td>2011-17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NF</td>
<td>2011-17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2006-10</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>2011-17</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2011-17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2006-10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2011-17</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2011-17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2006-10</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>NF</td>
<td>2011-17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NF</td>
<td>2011-17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2006-10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2011-17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>2011-17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>2006-10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2011-17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2011-17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Countries were at war*

Table 2: Average Political Rights (PR), Civic Liberties (CL) and Freedom Status report of post-conflict countries in Africa.  

Source: Compiled from Freedom House report since 2000.

Generally, the introduction of electoral democracy in war-torn states in Africa has intensified social conflicts and facilitated the formation of ‘prebendal state’. Owing to elected war-lords have maliciously abused the state apparatus to their advantage and endangered protection of human rights, constitutionalism, rule of law, freedom of the press, etc. (Brahimi, 2007; Roberts, 2011; Curtis, 2012). Hence, the intuition of liberal peacebuilding to transfer “old democracies” to new war-torn countries confirms liberal peace is conservative, hegemonic and state-centric (Richmond, 2011).

**Defects of economic liberalization as instrument of peacebuilding**

The other critique of liberal peacebuilding is that the presumption of economic liberalization will sustain domestic and international peace in countries emerging from protracted civil wars in Africa. Paris (2004) observed that peacebuilding unleashes the innate paradoxical nature of liberalism and capitalism, where economic prosperity hinges on the societal competition. Hence, free market economy coupled with the absence of institutional structures which are capable of overseeing economic and public policies exacerbate societal conflict, corruption, socio-economic marginalization, etc. (Paris, 2010; Richmond, 2009; Salih, 2009).

I discuss here three critiques against the intent of liberal peacebuilding through economic liberalization. First, post-conflict countries in Africa are presented with the “same old” magic potion of the 1970s and 80s for their economic ailments, that failed to improve the economic performance and milieu hitherto (Bah, 2017). Cooper, Turner and Pug (2011) noted that the structural adjustment, with its vested agenda, has been a driver of conflict in the global South. For instance, Keen (2005) explained how the 1970s and 80s liberalization policies contributed to the civil war in Sierra Leone. And this begs a question, “why economic liberalization, again?” As cited in Cooper et al. (2011), Ha-Joon Chang, Cambridge economist, pointed out that developing countries relished their best economic growth rate and increase in per capita income during the 1960s and 1970s under state-

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5 NF, PF, and F stand for “Not Free”, “Partially Free”, and “Free” respectively. With 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free rating. A larger aggregate score indicates a greater level of freedom. Countries whose combined average ratings fall between 3.0 and 5.0 are “Partially Free”, and those between 5.5 and 7.0 are “Not Free.”
Nevertheless, the hegemonic liberal ideology downplays a state-led economy and preaches the market-oriented economy as a driver of peace. Cooper et al. (2011) asserted the World Bank, through its seat in the Peacebuilding Commission and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), explicitly defines conditionality and leverage to focus on building state institutions to institutionalize neo-liberal political economy. According to Paris (2010) Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone have experienced rapid privatization and free market fixes. The efforts have failed to guarantee the peace dividend to evenly shared and, in some cases, peace itself was jeopardized.

Further, it is possible to argue that the application of economic liberalization in the West and in the post-conflict Africa countries is different and demonstrates double standard (Salih, 2009). Cooper et al. (2011) and Selby (2013) stipulated that while the West, during the 2007 economic recession have engaged in massive intervention to prop up ‘ailing banks’, subsidies to private companies, runs welfare programmes and redistribute wealth through philanthropic agencies, yet these measures in Africa are abhorred by the West. Privatization of public enterprises, reduced state subsidies, deregulation of capital markets and lowering of barriers to international trade is weighed down to war shattered Africans. As Willet (2005) stated, in the post-conflict Mozambique, the economic liberalization policies appear to have made life more difficult for ordinary citizens rising the absolute level of poverty, sharpening inequalities between rich and poor, and restricting government efforts to build schools, health clinics, roads and other amenities.

Moreover, Western liberal peacebuilders, under the auspices of the UN, trusted that post-conflict African countries will live up to the virtues of Weberian State (Taylor, 2009). Accordingly, the UN and international financial institutions overlooked the states’ institutional limitations while attempting to institute a market economy not only to galvanize the economic inequality, but also to perpetuated policies of clientiesm (Paris, 1997; Cooper et al., 2011; Taylor, 2009; Kurz, 2010).

Looking at the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia (see the analysis below) highlights how the economic liberalization have done much harm than good to the wider population. Women, children and the elderly were tremendously affected in the war and hence they remained poor.

**Sierra Leone:** As Kurz (2010) noted, little has improved for nearly 70 percent of rural Sierraleonans. Subsistence agriculture and little trading continue to be their way of life. After a decade of peacebuilding and international donations, Dobbins and Miller (2013) pointed out that the country’s progress remains fragile in all terms. Beveers (2016) further confirmed that the economic prosperity pledged by the liberal peacebuilding remained in vain as the country continues to live in poverty, with low life expectancy, poor basic amenities, pervasive corruption, and unbreakable patronage networks.

Graphs 1 and 4 clearly shows that the Sierra Leone is unable to make practical improvement in terms of “Human Development” (HD) and per capita parameters; it was ranked 179 out of 188 countries and grouped as low income country with US$ 505 in 2016. The Fragile States Index (FSI) of 2017 report also classified fragility risk of Sierra Leone as ‘High Warning’.

**Liberia:** As Beevers (2016) pointed out, prioritizing marketization of natural resources in Liberia, used in an effort to spur economic recovery, has produced a history of corruption and patronage beginning from the time of Charles Taylor. This shows that foreign
business and government officials were getting rich, local people were being deceived, harassed, and further impoverished. Beevers (2016) also observed that in post-conflict Liberia, the issue of land ownership, the share of the local community from the natural resources, and the lack of job opportunities for the youth continue to challenge the country’s political economy. As Brahami (2007) also mentioned, disenchanted youths have been nostalgic of the good old days of Charles Taylor when they had guns, money, and power. Moreover, graph 1 and 4 illustrates that, the country ranked 177 out of 188 countries in HDI in 2015 with $455 USD per capita; it remained a low-income country. Furthermore, the FSI (2017) report classified the country’s fragility status as “Alert”.

![Graph 1: Post-conflict countries per capita income since 2000 (compiled from WB report)](image1)

![Graph 2: Human Development Index report of selected post-conflict states (source: compiled from the UNDP report)](image2)
As can be understood from graphs 1 and 2, in terms of per capita and HDI value, all the countries with the exception of Namibia fall short in improvement efforts on both parameters in the post-conflict period. Graph 1 clearly indicates that Namibia and Angola have the highest per capita in the list. Indeed, Namibia was hailed as a success of UN peacebuilding mission. Though, the success is guaranteed by the retreat of the South African Apartheid regime (which was illegally administrating Namibia) owing to international sanctions (Malaquias, 2002). Further, and perhaps paradoxically, Angola’s high per capita is attributed to the oil-led economy, and yet, the HDI (2016) report ranked Angola 150 out of 188 countries, indicating low human development.

The sustainability of conflict resolution in war-torn African countries appears to be unrelated to the amount and composition of post-conflict aids, humanitarian emergencies, and post-conflict economic reconstruction programmes that contribute to the multi-layered challenges in post-conflict countries (Nunnenkamp, 2016; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002). The short-term humanitarian emergencies were unbalanced due to the enduring social deficits that stem from the conflicts (Salih, 2009). Besides, the economic reconstruction programmes were exhausted at a rate well beyond the capability of post-conflict economies to comprehend (Hoffman, 2009). Eventually, economic reconstruction efforts have created donor dependent post-conflict states in Africa (Ndikumana, 2015). Hoffman (2009: 10) rightly pointed out that “not only has liberal peacebuilding done more harm than good, it is, in reality, an exercise in power that seeks to subjugate the non-west by creating dependency through chronically weak states.”

Cultural indifference, lack of local ownership, and building virtual peace

Novel Laureate Amartya Sen (2006: 51) noted that “democracy is often seen as a quint-essentially Western idea which is alien to the non-Western world.” However, the culture of public discussion, apart from electoral democracy, has prevailed in other non-Western civilizations including Africa. Fischer (2000: 26) also asserted that Africans are not “inherently incapable of becoming true liberal because they remained outside the Western tradition.”

I find two blind spots in the application of liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict societies in terms of its axiological foundations. First, while some argue that liberal peace values are not alien to African traditions (Sen, 2006), it is also possible to argue that liberal peace values are incompatible with post-conflict situations. As Richmond (2009) precisely pointed out, liberal peacebuilding is culturally insensitive and trust in rebuilding Westphalian state forms cures all the ailments of post-conflict societies. Countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, Rwanda, and Burundi, to mention a few, have adopted political and economic liberalization without diagnoses; the prognoses and therapy of their problems. Thus, according to Salih (2009: 67), it is practically improbable for post-conflict societies to easily grasp the “the ethos and core values of liberalism.”

Chandler (2010) discussed how “Western models” are destined to fail due to their lack of authenticity in the eyes of the non-Western. Richmond (2011) and Barnett (2005) noted that the overwhelming misconception of transferring liberal principles easily into post-conflict societies in a short period of time that took the West centuries demonstrate peace building endeavors are “acultural”, “ethically bankrupt,” and “coercive”. On the contrary, Ignatieff (1993) blamed non-liberal poor societies that are divided along ethnic and religious lines and argued they lack substantial state tradition which explains the failure of liberal peace. Hoffman (2009) strengthened this argument and suggested that the failure of liberal peace in Africa is attributed to the culture of neo-paternalism – per-
sonal rule, ‘Big Man’ politics, nepotism, and clientelism. However, Salih (2009) questioned why Western thoughts should be hastily adopted to African countries given the underlying traits are being criticized in the West. For Jabir (2013), the colonial rationality is the driving force behind peacebuilding operations. As Paris (2002: 637) briefly stated “... peacebuilding resembles an updated (and more benign) version of the mission civilisatrice.” In this regard Mbembe (2001: 237) wrote,

More prosaically, we sought to define the quantitative and qualitative difference, if any, between the colonial period and what followed: have we really entered another period, or do we find the same theater, the same mimetic acting, with different actors and spectators, but with the same convulsions and the same insult? Can we really talk of moving beyond colonialism?

Second, since liberal peacebuilding is unidirectional, top-down, and emphasizes governmentality, policy alternatives are imperative (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). Liberal peacebuilders merely exhibit their band of shock therapy and fail to address the root causes of the war (in the absence of comprehensive peace accords) (Barnett, 2005). For example, in Liberia alone, 13 peace accords collapsed up until 1996; within a year of the 1999 Lome Peace Agreement, Sierra Leone reverted to crisis (Drew & Ramsbotham, nd). Furthermore, the Arusha Agreement has failed to address the root causes of Burundian conflict (Curtis, 2012).

The “local turn” or an in-depth “local-local” engagement in peacebuilding is being recognized as an alternative approach (Richmond, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2015). However, Maschietto (2018) argued that the enthusiasm to integrate traditional conflict resolutions into international peacebuilding efforts may end up in reinforcing inequalities and hierarchies. A classic example of this point is the effort of romanticizing the revival of the local chiefdoms in Sierra Leone by the international peacebuilding initiatives, distinctively by Britain. This oversight contributed to the break out of the civil war and the persistent resentment against the chieftaincy (Dobbins et al., 2013; Kurz, 2010). Furthermore, the collaboration of local-international peacebuilding efforts in Burundi produced an illiberal outcome (Curtis, 2012). As Richmond (2011: 16) clearly puts it, the failure of liberal peacebuilding to “recognize local cultural norms and traditions has created a ‘virtual peace’ in its many theaters.”

**Conclusion**

Three conclusions can be drawn from the discussion on the applications of liberal peace in post-conflict peacebuilding in Africa. First, the idea of liberal peace conflates contradictory elements. Although instances in the West that have successfully entrenched liberal thoughts through centuries-old efforts, the concomitant institution of liberalism and democracy instigates more damages to the ill-equipped post-conflict states. According to Dahl (1971), the risky route to democracy has been adopted by war-torn countries. Paris (1997) also argued that institutionalization should come before liberalization in order to ameliorate the repercussion of liberalization. Besides, the culture of democracy and the telos of liberalism are alien to the post-conflict societies in Africa. While Sen (2006) might argue that democracy is a universal principle, my analysis of the data showed that countries in the shadow of civil war who have undertaken elections have never achieved the intended ‘social contract’ promised by liberalism. Instead, these liberal efforts further fuelled instability; Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, and Rwanda to mention a few are good examples. Furthermore, the underlying nature of free market economy rests on competition which perpetuated economic inequality, dependency, nepotism, and creation of
“prebendal” state in post-conflict societies (Taylor, 2009).

Second, liberalization in the West and in war-torn African countries highlights a double standard and contradiction. The West accompanies liberal policies with crucial welfare policies, while the African liberalization experiment propagates privatization of public enterprises, reduces state subides, deregulates capital markets, and reduces barriers to international trade (Selby, 2013). This hampers the development and implementation of basic amenities such as schools, health clinics, and road infrastructures in the post-conflict states that are expected to be delivered to citizens.

Third, liberal peace is ‘acultural’ and insensitive towards recipient of the peacebuilding (Richmond, 2011). This has led to the unholy marriage of local and global peacebuilding undertakings. Practically the ideological and normative difference in the local-global or bottom-up peacebuilding praxis has promoted illiberal outcome (Pugh, 2011). In conclusion, liberal peacebuilding contributed to the perpetuation of “virtual” peace in post-conflict countries, for its flaws to address the root causes of the conflict.

References


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